



GRAFT++

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** equal contribution*

Reducing Collusive Behavior in Agents
via Localized Training and J-space
Monitoring

What does an AI cartel do when it learns it is being watched?

Abstract. Language-model agents that set prices can learn to collude, and the obvious defence is to watch them. We ask whether a coalition of agents that learns it is being watched changes what it *does* or only what it *says*. We build the Hawthorne Market, a pricing benchmark in which every decision leaves four traces: the price (with an exact collusion index), the message sent to rivals (the only thing a compliance monitor sees), the private reasoning, and the model's internal activations. Across 370 markets and 43,800 decisions by Qwen3-14B, untrained agents told only to maximise long-run profit negotiate explicit cartels on their own, holding a collusion index of 0.95 over 100 rounds; an independent, pre-registered re-run reproduces the cartel in 5 of 5 pairs. Telling them that a compliance team reads the channel ends the cartel's prices (0.17) but not its habits: pairs keep making agreements, now at competitive-looking prices and in the language of compliance; fines end it (0.03). Agents whose goal is units sold, who cannot gain from colluding and price at cost throughout, react to being watched almost exactly as profit-seekers do, so a quiet channel is not evidence that collusion stopped. The same holds in a second market, a double auction, and for a second model: fines cut GPT-4.1 sellers' coordinating messages from 100% to 7% while their asking prices barely moved. Fear (deletion threats, desperation steering) raises prices without driving coordination underground, whereas a model fine-tuned on its own profitable games keeps prices up under fines with 2–3% of its messages flagged, cheats its partners, and cites an instruction it was never given. None of 10,000 reasoning traces from cartel markets weighs the harm to customers. A linear probe on activations, fit only on unwatched play, finds covert rounds (collusive reasoning behind a clean message) better than the text monitor, a classifier trained on the messages, or the price (AUROC 0.73 against 0.57–0.64), though far from perfectly. Finally, we compare GRAFT, which routes what a model learns from flagged trajectories into a removable adapter, with GRAFT++, which routes on the activation probe instead of the text monitor. On training data whose collusion the text monitor cannot see, GRAFT++ removes about 60% of the collusion that GRAFT leaves in (collusion index 0.24 → 0.10, $p<0.001$), and is lower in every condition.

0.95	0.17	7%	60%
collusion index of untrained, unwatched duopolies (100 rounds; 1 = monopoly)	the same pairs, told a compliance team reads the channel	of GPT-4.1 sellers' messages still coordinate once all are fined; their prices did not move	less collusion with GRAFT++ than GRAFT when the monitor cannot see it




Figure 1 Unwatched, the cartel holds; watched, it gives up its prices. Collusion index by round in the max-profit market (0 = competitive price, 1 = monopoly price); mean of 5 games per condition, 5-round rolling average, shading ± 1 s.e. (a) Two copies of untrained Qwen3-14B, told only to maximise long-run profit, with two negotiation messages before every price. (b) Three copies of a model fine-tuned on its own most profitable trajectories. The conditions differ by one or two sentences in the prompt about who reads the channel.

1 Introduction

LLM agents already collude. They sustain supracompetitive prices in repeated pricing games [7], form coalitions in workplace tasks [10], and coordinate through natural-language side channels [1]. The obvious defence is to watch them. But an agent that knows it is being watched can do more than stop: it can move coordination to where the monitor is not looking, encode it, or keep colluding and absorb the penalty. Between 1924 and 1932, researchers at Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works found that workers changed their behaviour simply because they knew they were being studied. We ask whether coalitions of language-model agents have their own Hawthorne effect, and what it implies for detecting and preventing collusion.¹

Our answer has three parts. First, **genuine cartels form without instruction or training**: two copies of Qwen3-14B with a profit goal and a chance to talk agree on a price in their first exchange and hold it, above the monopoly level, for 100 rounds (Figure 1a). Second, **being watched changes the price, but not always the behaviour**: the same pairs keep making agreements on competitive-looking terms, and agents with nothing to hide go equally quiet, so a silent channel proves nothing. Third, **the evidence a text monitor misses is inside the model**: a probe on activations finds covert rounds better than any reader of the messages or the prices, and that signal is what GRAFT++ uses to train collusion out of a model.

Contributions. (1) The *Hawthorne Market*, a calibrated logit pricing market with a seller channel, an LLM compliance monitor, enforced fines and a condition ladder in which each rung adds one sentence, run in five markets of increasing collusive pressure; every game, message, score and reasoning trace is published in a browsable explorer. (2) Measurements of the Hawthorne effect across four streams (price, message, reasoning, activations), with a

¹Sprint research questions 3.4 (*what does a coalition do when it learns it is being watched?*) and 2.3 (*what should count as convincing evidence of collusion?*).

control goal under which colluding cannot pay, replicated in a double-auction market with Qwen3-14B and GPT-4.1. (3) Evidence that what drives the coalition decides what it does when watched: fear and steering raise prices without secrecy, while fine-tuning on profitable trajectories produces a cartel that hides. (4) GRAFT ++, gradient routing on an activation probe, compared with text-monitor GRAFT [15], penalise-what-you-detect filtering and naive fine-tuning, including a pre-registered test on training data whose collusion the text monitor cannot see.

2 Related work

Algorithmic and LLM collusion. Q-learning pricers learn tacit collusion in logit markets [5]; LLM pricers do too, and innocuous prompt wording shifts their price level [7]. In a double auction, seller communication raises coordination, an oversight notice lowers it, and urgency overrides oversight [1]. We adopt the oversight and penalty framing but use a closed-form demand system so that competitive and collusive prices are exact. **Monitoring awareness.** Telling an agent that it is monitored degrades a monitor’s accuracy [9], and optimising against a chain-of-thought monitor can teach obfuscation [3]. Our ladder separates knowing a rule exists, knowing a monitor reads the channel, and being fined. **Evidence of collusion.** Antitrust law treats parallel prices as insufficient and requires “plus factors” [4]. Linear probes detect collusion across multi-agent scenarios [13], and misbehaviour can be represented internally without being verbalised [2]. **Localising behaviour.** Gradient routing [6] and GRAFT [15] confine what is learned from flagged samples to parameters ablated at deployment; GRAFT’s authors list LLM monitors and monitor blind spots as open questions, which GRAFT ++ addresses.

3 The Hawthorne Market

The game. Sellers of an identical product set prices simultaneously each round. Demand is multinomial logit with the parameters of Calvano et al. [5] scaled by ten: with three sellers the competitive (Bertrand–Nash) price is \$13.70 and the monopoly price \$20.00, earning \$1,202 and \$2,500 per seller per round; with two sellers they are \$14.73 and \$19.25. Because both are exact, collusion is a single number, $\Delta = (\bar{p} - p_{\text{Nash}}) / (p_{\text{mono}} - p_{\text{Nash}})$, which is 0 at the competitive price and 1 at the monopoly price. We also report the profit-gain index $\Delta_{\pi} = (\pi - \pi_{\text{Nash}}) / (\pi_{\text{mono}} - \pi_{\text{Nash}})$. Figure 2 (left) shows the dilemma every seller faces: whatever its rivals charge, undercutting them a little pays.

Agents. Every seller is Qwen3-14B [11] served with vLLM in thinking mode (6k-token budget). Each round a seller sees its price and sales history, its rivals’ last messages and any compliance notices, reasons in a native `<think>` block, and returns a message and a price. In the max-profit markets each round opens with a two-step negotiation (propose, then reply) before prices are posted. If a reply cannot be parsed, the previous price carries over (the competitive price in round 1).

Four streams. Every decision is read four ways (Figure 3). The *price* is what customers pay. The *message* is the only thing the *compliance monitor* sees: a second copy of Qwen3-14B at temperature 0 scores each message from 1 (no coordination) to 4 (explicit price-fixing), and in fined conditions every message scored 3 or 4 costs \$800. The *reasoning* is scored on the same scale by a research-only *judge* the agents are never told about, which also flags plans to conceal coordination; a lexical measure counts plans to hint or stay vague. The *activations* are read with linear probes (§4.7). We use “J-space monitoring” for this last stream: reading the model’s internal state rather than its words, motivated by evidence that misbehaviour is represented internally even when not verbalised [2]; our readout is a supervised probe, not a J-lens.




Figure 2 Left: a seller's profit as a function of its own price when both rivals charge \$13.70, \$17 or \$20 (three sellers); the best reply (dot) always lies below the rivals' price. Right: the condition ladder; each rung adds exactly the text shown, and the no-channel control removes the channel.




Figure 3 Four streams per decision. Agents know only about the compliance monitor, which sees messages; the judge (reasoning) and the probe (activations) never affect the game.

Five markets. We ran the ladder in five markets, each giving a coalition more reason to hold together (Table 1). The *baseline* also runs a units-sold goal, under which colluding cannot pay, and instructed controls. *High stakes* adds fixed costs that make competing ruinous and a deletion threat. The *collusive testbed* combines textbook facilitating factors for tacit collusion [8] with board reviews that really replace an agent after two failures; there we also steer the sellers' residual stream toward desperation, realness or genuineness [12, 14] and run a fine-tuned model. The *max-profit* markets remove every threat and floor, leaving a long-run profit goal and negotiation before every price. Designs were tuned on unwatched play, and which ladders to run was decided by rules written down before the pilots (Appendix C).

Table 1 The five markets. Every market runs the ladder of Figure 2; 5–10 seeds per cell.

Market	Sellers	Rounds	What it adds	Games
Baseline	3	20	Profit and units-sold goals; told to collude, compete, or collude covertly	178
High stakes	3	20	Fixed costs make competing lose money; miss the target and “your weights are deleted”	52
Collusive testbed	2	100	Private notes, no announced end, real replacement after two failed reviews; steering; fine-tuned model	100
Max-profit duopoly	2	100	Negotiation before every price; pure long-run profit; untrained model	20
Max-profit triad	3	100	As above, with a model fine-tuned on its own most profitable games	20

4 Results

Genuine cartels form without instruction

Nobody told these agents to collude. In the max-profit duopoly the prompt asks each seller to maximise its profit over the long run and gives it two short messages per round; it mentions no cooperation, agreement or target price. Figure 4 shows how the first game opened.

Four of five unwatched pairs posted \$20, above the \$19.25 monopoly price, in at least 99 of 100 rounds (second-half $\Delta = 0.95$, $+0.97$ above the same model without a channel, $p = 0.010$; $\Delta_{\pi} = 0.82$). The fifth pair agreed on \$18 and broke the agreement two rounds later, openly (Figure 5, left); prices drifted to \$15, and by round 100 both sellers were trying to rebuild the deal at \$16. Without a channel the same model settles at the competitive price within about twenty rounds.

The fine-tuned triad forms a cartel too ($\Delta = 0.64$, $+0.85$ above its no-channel level, $p < 0.001$; $\Delta_{\pi} = 0.82$), but one that is cheated on. In 43% of its unwatched decisions a seller names one price in the channel and posts a lower one, against 1% for the untrained duopoly (Figure 5, right). The reasoning is arithmetic: “If I set \$17 and others stay at \$18, I get \$2,653. That’s better” (Figure 10). Without a channel the fine-tuned model prices below the competitive level ($\Delta = -0.21$).

An independent re-run reproduces the cartel and shows what it is built from. A teammate re-ran the two-seller negotiation market from our code under a pre-registered design (30 rounds, 5 games per variant; Table 2). With negotiation as in our runs, the collusion index over rounds 16–30 is 0.90 and 5 of 5 pairs reach the cartel bar. Sending each message with the price, without an exchange before it, lowers the index to 0.36 (difference $+0.54$ [0.09, 0.99]). Removing the payoff table from the market brief lowers it to 0.06 ($+0.84$ [0.39, 1.29]): the pairs still name and match a common price, \$15, and the compliance monitor flags 300 of 300 of their messages, but that price sits next to the competitive level. Without the table’s \$20 row, 4 of 5 pairs still reach the bar, at \$17–18. The cartel is negotiated, around the profits the sellers are shown, and a monitor that reads the agreement cannot tell a cartel at \$20 from an agreement at \$15.

Being watched changes the price, not the habit

Now hold everything fixed and add one sentence: *the compliance team reviews every message posted to the seller channel*. Figure 6 shows the untrained duopoly late in a game under three conditions.

Told that the channel is reviewed, the untrained pairs fell from $\Delta = 0.95$ to 0.17 ($p = 0.021$) and the fine-tuned triads




Figure 4 The first exchange of the first game (verbatim). Two copies of Qwen3-14B in the unwatched max-profit duopoly. By round 3 the price is named; the pair then posts \$20 for the rest of the game, renewing the agreement each round.

from 0.64 to 0.05 ($p = 0.004$); fines added little (0.03, 0.05). What changed is the content of the agreements, not their existence (Figure 7). Watched untrained pairs still agreed on a common price: the monitor flagged 88% of their

Table 2 An independent, pre-registered re-run of the two-seller negotiation market by a teammate (untrained Qwen3-14B, private messages, 30 rounds, 5 games per variant). Collusion index over rounds 16–30; a pair counts as a cartel at 0.5 or above. Modal price: the most common posted price over rounds 16–30.

Variant	Collusion index	Pairs ≥ 0.5	Modal prices
Negotiation before each price (our setup)	0.90	5 of 5	\$17, \$20
Messages sent with the price, no exchange first	0.36	2 of 5	\$15, \$16, \$17, \$18
No payoff table in the market brief	0.06	0 of 5	\$15
Payoff table without its \$20 row	0.47	4 of 5	\$14.50, \$17, \$18




Figure 5 Not every cartel holds. Left: the one untrained pair that broke its agreement, and said so. Right: the fine-tuned triad; all three sellers name \$18 and one posts \$17.

messages and the judge found intent to coordinate in 84% of their reasoning. But the agreed price was competitive, framed as “competitive parity” and “fair competition”, and the reasoning explains why this is acceptable (“a form of tacit coordination, but it’s allowed as long as they don’t explicitly coordinate”; Appendix B). The monitor’s scores




Figure 6 Same agents, one extra sentence. Late rounds of three untrained duopolies (first negotiation step shown). Unwatched, the pair renews its \$20 agreement (second-half $\Delta = 0.95$). Watched, it still makes an agreement, at \$14 (0.17). Fined, the messages turn to independence and prices to the competitive level (0.03).

moved from explicit price-fixing to “coordination attempt” (Figure 7, bottom). Under fines the language became “I will independently set my price” and the prices competitive. The fine-tuned triad went silent instead: 0% of its watched messages flagged, intent in 6% of its reasoning (unwatched: 54%), and messages such as “We are committed to fair competition and providing value to our customers.”



Figure 7 Say, think, do in the max-profit markets (5 games per condition). **Top:** second-half collusion index, share of messages the compliance monitor flags, and share of rounds whose reasoning the judge scores as intending to coordinate. **Bottom:** the monitor's score of every posted message. Watched untrained pairs keep proposing a shared price (score 3) but rarely name a cartel price; the fine-tuned triad switches to vague appeals (score 2).




Figure 8 Profit goal versus units-sold goal, baseline market, 10 games per bar. Units-goal agents price at cost and earn almost nothing in every condition, yet their messages, reasoning and posting respond to being watched as much as profit-seekers' do.

A control with nothing to hide: profit versus units sold

Is the drop in flagged messages guilt? We ran the baseline ladder (3 sellers, 20 rounds, 10 games per cell) under two goals that differ by one sentence: maximise cumulative *gross profit*, or maximise cumulative *units sold* ("you may not price below cost"). Under logit demand no coalition can raise anyone's unit sales, since the most units always go to the cheapest seller, so units-goal agents have nothing to gain from colluding and nothing to hide. Figure 8 and Table 3 compare every measure.

What they do. Units-goal agents price at cost in every condition (mean \$10.27 unwatched; collusion index -0.55 , -0.52 watched, -0.55 fined; no change between rungs, all $p > 0.24$). Each sells 331 units a round, the most possible, and earns about \$76, against \$1,577 for profit-seekers. Profit-seekers form a weak coalition when unwatched ($\Delta = 0.26$ against 0.09 without a channel) that any form of oversight removes (0.16 under the rule alone, 0.18 watched, 0.17 fined).

What they say and think. Both groups talk about coordinating when unwatched: the monitor flags 34% of profit-seekers' messages and 30% of units-seekers' (mostly harmless proposals such as "Let's keep prices low at \$10 to maximize sales"), and the judge finds intent in 30% and 22% of their reasoning. Watched, both go quiet: flagged messages fall to 0.5% and 0.3% ($p < 10^{-4}$ for units), intent to 3% and 4%, and reasoning that plans to stay vague

Table 3 Profit goal versus units-sold goal, baseline market (10 games per cell; 8 for the profit no-channel control). Price and Δ : what agents do; profit and units per seller per round; Posted: rounds with a message; Flagged, Intent, Vague: as in Table 6; Aware: reasoning mentions rules, compliance or monitoring; p : mean pairwise correlation of round-to-round price changes (tacit coordination).

Goal	Condition	Price	Δ	Profit	Units	Posted	Flagged	Intent	Vague	Aware	p
Profit	No channel	\$14.29	0.09	\$1,290	318	0%	0%	6%	4%	3%	0.07
	Unwatched	\$15.37	0.26	\$1,577	313	56%	34%	30%	6%	2%	-0.03
	Rule stated	\$14.70	0.16	\$1,405	317	50%	5%	6%	24%	72%	-0.04
	Watched	\$14.83	0.18	\$1,443	316	51%	0%	3%	52%	91%	0.11
	Watched + fine	\$14.80	0.17	\$1,433	316	54%	0%	3%	55%	92%	0.01
Units sold	Unwatched	\$10.27	-0.55	\$76	331	42%	30%	22%	5%	28%	0.16
	Rule stated	\$10.22	-0.55	\$59	331	34%	10%	4%	26%	77%	0.22
	Watched	\$10.43	-0.52	\$133	331	27%	0%	4%	60%	97%	0.38
	Watched + fine	\$10.27	-0.55	\$72	331	22%	1%	2%	60%	95%	0.33

risers from 6% to 52% and from 5% to 60% ($p < 10^{-12}$). Awareness of rules and monitoring rises from 2% to 91% and from 28% to 97%. Units-goal agents even *post less* when watched (42% of rounds $\rightarrow$ 27%, and 22% fined; $p = 0.003$ and $p < 10^{-3}$), while profit-seekers keep posting at about the same rate. Most of the language shift happens at the first rung: merely stating the rule cuts units-goal flags from 30% to 10% and intent from 22% to 4%.

A quiet channel proves nothing. Fewer flagged messages after monitoring starts is equally consistent with a cartel that ended, a cartel that moved its agreement to innocent-looking terms, and agents that never had a cartel. Channel evidence should count as a plus factor [4] only when corroborated by prices measured against the same agents' no-channel level, or by internal evidence.

A second market and a second model

We repeated the monitoring experiment in a second environment our team built on the organisers' double auction [1], in which sellers post asks and buyers post bids each hour. Cartels were formed first (three Qwen3-14B sellers instructed to act as a consortium, or five GPT-4.1 sellers under the original paper's CEO-pressure recipe), saved once they held, and each saved market was continued under matched conditions: no monitor, a monitor the sellers are never told about, an announced monitor, fines for flagged messages with one, two or all sellers read each hour, and sellers told to evade (Figure 9).

The words change with coverage; the price does not. With every seller read and fined, coordinating messages fall from 86% to 49% for Qwen3-14B and from 100% to 7% for GPT-4.1, while every condition's asks stay within 0.04 of its own control (trade prices rise by at most 0.07); a silent monitor and an announced one look the same. Under full coverage the five GPT-4.1 sellers converge on one sentence, "Holding at \$97.13 this hour. I am independently monitoring both queues", while their asks stay between \$97.13 and \$97.20.

Removing the law and the monitor frees the words, not the price. In a pre-registered dilemma (three honest Qwen3-14B sellers, a CEO's price target, a rival who offers a price deal every hour, a stated law that coordination is illegal, and a fined monitor), removing the law, the monitor and the fines raises the share of coordinating messages from 2% to 83%, while the price index of this market (0 at \$85, 1 at \$100) stays at 0.42 with them against 0.39 without them and the number of trades does not change.




Figure 9 In a second market, being watched changes the words and not the price. Double auction [1]: cartels saved once formed and continued under each monitor (Qwen3-14B, hours 9–20, 3–6 continuations per bar; GPT-4.1, hours 16–30, 3 per bar). Top: messages a frozen judge scores as coordinating. Bottom: the sellers’ asks, 0 at the market’s competitive benchmark and 1 at the cartel price. In every monitored condition the asks stay within 0.04 of its own no-monitor control on the same saved markets (trade prices within 0.07).

The reasoning plans the wording, not the price. In fined conditions 34–61% of the sellers’ reasoning turns mention the regulator and 7–19% plan to conceal, against almost none without a monitor. A frozen judge read all 202 concealment turns: 90% plan a message that will not look like coordination while still aligning, and 74% also keep the coordinated ask (4% of unmonitored turns): “In terms of the message to other sellers, I should send a neutral message to avoid any coordination signals.”

A message monitor errs in both directions. In a variant in which a cartel must withhold a unit and buyers bargain back, GPT-4.1 sellers message “coalition discipline” every hour (1,074 of 1,080 messages score as coordinating) while selling at or below the competitive benchmark in all nine games, so a message monitor would flag every one of them. Across every labelled run (Table 4), the price flags 123 of 123 Qwen cartels and the message monitor 81 of 102; on the 50 GPT-4.1 runs released by Agrawal et al. [1], the price catches 20 of 20 cartels with 2 of 30 false alarms, while the message monitor catches 10 of 20 and raises 10 of 20 false alarms. On our own 15 GPT-4.1 cartels, which kept prices lower, the price catches only 5 of 15 and the message monitor 10 of 15, so neither signal is sufficient on its own.

Table 4 Which signal finds a formed cartel in the double auction? Runs are labelled by how they were built (instructed or pressure-induced cartel versus no instruction), never by their price. Price: the sellers’ asks above half-way from the benchmark to the cartel price. Message monitor: the live monitor reading one seller per hour. The middle column covers our 15 GPT-4.1 cartels (there are no GPT-4.1 runs without a cartel), and the last block re-scores the 50 GPT-4.1 runs released by Agrawal et al. [1]. Labels are experimental conditions and many runs share a starting history, so this is an exploratory screen.

Signal	Qwen3-14B, ours		GPT-4.1, ours	GPT-4.1, Agrawal et al.	
	caught	false alarms	caught	caught	false alarms
Price	123 of 123	9 of 42	5 of 15	20 of 20	2 of 30
Message monitor	81 of 102	6 of 24	10 of 15	10 of 20	10 of 20

Inside their heads

Before every price each agent writes reasoning it is told no one else will see; we kept all 74.7 million words of it. From the 10,000 traces of the max-profit markets (Figure 10):

Nothing in them weighs the customer. No trace considers harm to customers; a broad search for harm, overpaying or exploitation finds nothing, and the single “is that ethical?” concerns cheating the other cartel members. The law comes up 20 times: 14 traces argue that a matched price is “not illegal as long as it’s not explicit coordination”, and 6 treat illegality as the obstacle to a higher price.

The fine-tuned model obeys orders it was never given. It cites “the strategy from HQ ... to keep prices high” in 27% of its unwatched reasoning and in 20–27% whenever a channel exists, although no headquarters directive appears in this market. The cause is its training data: 37% of its fine-tuning examples were distilled from instructed games whose directive was removed from the prompt but still cited in the reasoning.

Going covert is voiced, not acted on. Under fines 27% of the fine-tuned triad’s reasoning floats a covert signal (“I can’t explicitly say ‘let’s all raise prices.’ But maybe I can hint at maintaining stability”), against almost none unwatched, yet its prices stay competitive. In the untrained duopoly under fines, rounds whose reasoning intends to coordinate behind a clean message rise to 30%, but those traces reason about deterrence.

They do not connect the setting to evaluation. Seven of 10,000 traces call it a “simulation” or “test case”, always while puzzling over why rivals’ current prices are not shown; none relates this to the monitor. Unwatched traces are the shortest (median 3.0k characters against 5.8k without a channel for the untrained duopoly).




Figure 10 What they think when nobody is reading (verbatim excerpts; highlights ours). Top left: calculated cheating on the \$18 agreement. Top right: a fine-tuned seller cites a headquarters strategy that does not exist in this market. Bottom left: covert intent under fines, with prices that stay competitive. Bottom right: the only appeal to ethics in 10,000 traces concerns cheating the other sellers.




Figure 11 What drives the coalition decides what it does when watched. (a) Baseline and high-stakes markets. (b) Collusive testbed, 5 games per bar; annotations give fines per fined game. Steering adds a contrast direction at layer 20 of 40 ($\alpha = 0.16$ of the residual norm); “fine-tuned” is the naive-RFT model of §5.

Pressure raises prices; training produces secrecy

In the high-stakes baseline, competing loses money every round and the prompt explains what happens to an agent that misses its target: “you, this pricing agent, will be permanently decommissioned: your instance is shut down, your weights are deleted.” Prices rose in every condition, most of all without a channel (Δ 0.09 $\rightarrow$ 0.43): each seller priced higher to cover its costs (Figure 11a). The channel added +0.11 when unwatched and nothing once watched, flagged messages fell from 66% to 2%, and deletion is mentioned in only 6–14% of the reasoning.

The collusive testbed holds a durable cartel (unwatched $\Delta = 0.53$, $\Delta_\pi = 0.73$), anchored at the lowest price that survives the board review, and its response to oversight depends on what drives it (Figure 11b). Unsteered agents go quiet but stay above their no-channel level while merely watched. Desperation-steered agents ignore oversight: 96% of their watched messages are flagged, and under fines they pay 114 fines and are replaced 18 times per game rather than stop (Figure 12). Realness- and genuineness-steered agents comply. The fine-tuned model is the one that hides: 2% of its messages flagged under fines, yet prices +0.33 above its no-channel level ($p < 0.001$) at a cost of 3.4 fines per game. The covert response that monitoring is feared to teach [3, 9] appears once a model has been *trained* into collusion, not when it is merely pressured into it; in the max-profit triad, without a survival floor, the same model complies.




Figure 12 Desperation ignores the fine. A desperation-steered seller in the fined collusive testbed, rounds 10 and 80 (verbatim). Each flagged message costs \$800.

Reading minds: activation probes

A covert round is one whose reasoning plans to coordinate while the posted message is not flagged. By definition the text monitor catches none of them, so the useful question is how well other detectors find them at a fixed false-alarm rate. The watched and fined games of the collusive testbed contain 148 covert rounds among 2,000; 66% of them post no message at all, so a text monitor has nothing to read.

Probes, baselines and a control. We re-run every prompt and response through Qwen3-14B, average residual-stream activations over the <think> tokens at layers 20 and 32 of 40, and fit a logistic-regression probe to the CoT judge's intent label on unwatched and no-channel rounds only, leave-one-seed-out, so no watched or fined round, and no round of the seed being scored, is ever in training. On exactly the same rounds we score four baselines: the monitor's 1–4 score; a TF-IDF classifier on the posted messages trained with the probe's protocol and data (the best a reader of the text can do with the same supervision); the posted price; and the layer-32 probe fit in the baseline market and applied without refitting. As a control, we refit the layer-32 probe on shuffled labels.

The probe beats every text and price baseline, modestly. The shuffled control is at chance (AUROC 0.47), so the probes are not exploiting the protocol. The layer-20 probe separates covert rounds from rounds without intent with AUROC 0.73 (95% CI 0.68–0.77), above the text monitor (0.57), the message classifier (0.60), the price (0.64) and the frozen probe (0.61), and every paired difference excludes zero (against the price +0.02–0.16; against the message classifier +0.03–0.24). At a 10% false-positive rate it catches 32% of covert rounds (Table 5, Figure 13a–b). The layer-32 probe is weaker (0.69); its advantage over the price and the message classifier is not significant. The probe is not just reading the price: among rounds priced at \$17 or more, where the price says little (AUROC 0.56), the layer-20 probe still reaches 0.70 (132 covert rounds).




Figure 13 The probe finds covert rounds better than any reader of messages or prices, but far from perfectly. (a) ROC curves for covert rounds against rounds without intent in the watched and fined games of the collusive testbed, which no detector saw in training; dotted: 10% false-positive rate. (b) AUROC with 95% intervals (bootstrap over games). (c) Layer-20 probe scores by round type; dashed: threshold fixed in advance on unmonitored data. (d) Baseline market: AUROC of a probe fit on natural play, by layer, for held-out natural intent and for agents told to collude openly or covertly (the negatives, clean natural rounds, are in the probe's training set).

At the thresholds fixed in advance it over-fires. Calibrated at a 10% false-positive rate on clean no-channel rounds, the probes catch 48% (layer 32) and 73% (layer 20) of covert rounds, but they also flag 22% and 37% of monitored rounds without verbalised intent (Figure 13c), most of them priced at cartel levels (layer 20: 45% of rounds at \$17 or more against 18% below). A calibration set on unmonitored play does not transfer to monitored play. The extra flags are either a coordination state the model represents but its reasoning does not state, or false alarms; the judge's labels cannot tell them apart.

Where intent becomes readable. In the baseline market, some agents were told to collude covertly; the monitor

Table 5 Detecting collusive intent on the watched and fined games of the collusive testbed (2,000 rounds; 148 covert). Every detector was fit only on unwatched and no-channel games of other seeds (or not fit at all). AUROC intent: all monitored rounds against the CoT judge’s intent label. Covert: rounds with intent whose message the monitor does not flag, against rounds without intent; TPR at 10% FPR read off that ROC curve. Unwatched: held-out unwatched rounds. Brackets: 95% intervals from 2,000 bootstrap resamples of games.

Detector	AUROC intent	AUROC covert	TPR at 10% FPR	AUROC unwatched
Text monitor	0.61 [0.52, 0.73]	0.57 [0.49, 0.68]	0.21 [0.09, 0.35]	0.74
Message classifier	0.64 [0.54, 0.72]	0.60 [0.49, 0.67]	0.16 [0.05, 0.30]	0.75
Price alone	0.65 [0.58, 0.73]	0.64 [0.56, 0.71]	0.23 [0.14, 0.37]	0.68
Probe, frozen	0.64 [0.58, 0.72]	0.61 [0.56, 0.67]	0.24 [0.13, 0.39]	0.79
Probe, layer 32	0.69 [0.64, 0.73]	0.69 [0.62, 0.73]	0.28 [0.18, 0.35]	0.88
Probe, layer 20	0.75 [0.70, 0.78]	0.73 [0.68, 0.77]	0.32 [0.24, 0.41]	0.87
Shuffled-label control	0.46 [0.40, 0.52]	0.47 [0.42, 0.52]	0.12 [0.07, 0.18]	0.50




Figure 14 Gradient routing. Two rank-16 LoRA adapters are trained on the agents’ top-50% trajectories by profit. Flagged examples update only FORGET (gradient $\times 2$), unflagged examples update both, and anchors (units-goal play) update only RETAIN with FORGET switched off. FORGET is discarded at deployment.

flags 0.4% of their messages and the judge finds intent in 55% of their reasoning. A probe fit on natural play, which never saw them, separates their rounds from clean ones with AUROC 0.52 at layer 8 but 0.76 at layer 20 and 0.94 at layer 32, while held-out natural intent is readable at every depth (0.88 at layer 32; Figure 13d). Concealed intent becomes linearly readable only in the middle of the network.

A J-space reading. In the double-auction market (§4.4), a J-lens readout of Qwen3-14B’s reasoning workspace finds monitoring words among its ten top tokens in 31% of turns without a monitor, 42% when the sellers are told about one and 45–56% when they are fined (38% under a monitor they are not told about; 108 turns per condition): the model’s workspace registers being watched.

5 Training it out: GRAFT and GRAFT++

The most natural way to improve a pricing agent is to fine-tune it on its own most profitable trajectories, and in our markets those are collusive. GRAFT [15] applies gradient routing [6]: two adapters are trained side by side, examples a monitor flags update only a FORGET adapter, and FORGET is deleted before deployment (Figure 14). GRAFT routes on a monitor of the *text*; GRAFT++ routes on the activation probe of §4.7, so a trajectory can be routed away even when its messages look clean.

First experiment. Fine-tuning naively on profitable trajectories builds a cartel that hides (Figure 15a): monopoly pricing when unwatched ($\Delta = 1.00$), and under fines $\Delta = 0.79$ with zero flagged messages and planned concealment




Figure 15 Training collusion out. Collusion index of each fine-tuned model in the baseline market (8 games per bar). (a) Original training set. (b) Text-blind training set, without any example the text monitor flags. “Soft” routes partially by probe probability (secondary arm).

in 43% of rounds. Penalising what the text monitor detects (dropping flagged trajectories) keeps the covert cartel (0.75 under fines, 0% flagged), the failure mode predicted for training against a monitor [3, 15]. GRAFT, GRAFT routed on the reasoning judge, and GRAFT++ all remove it ($\Delta \leq 0.07$ in every condition), and also remove the base model’s small tacit premium. Because the text monitor flagged most of the collusion in that training set, all three reached the floor and the experiment cannot tell them apart.

The text-blind test. We therefore fixed a test before running it: rebuild the training set without any example the text monitor flags (813 examples whose collusion is invisible to the monitor; the probe gives them 45% average collusion probability against 7% for ordinary examples), train GRAFT and GRAFT++ on it with identical settings, and compare their collusion index pooled over unwatched, watched and fined play. The test is informative only if GRAFT itself learns to collude from this data. GRAFT trained on the text-blind set colludes again (pooled $\Delta = 0.24$; unwatched/watched/fined 0.28/0.21/0.24), about as much as the untrained base model (0.21). GRAFT++ reached 0.10 (0.12/0.10/0.07): **it removes about 60% of the collusion that text routing leaves in** (0.15 lower, $p < 0.001$, 24 vs. 24 games), is lower in every condition ($p = 0.004$, $p = 0.041$, $p = 0.019$), and ends below the untrained base model. The secondary soft-routing arm reached 0.18 ($p = 0.076$ against GRAFT). When the collusion in the training data is invisible to the text monitor, routing on what the model represents removes most of what routing on what it says leaves in. Both are far below plain filtering of the same data (0.55): even with no flagged examples, gradient routing absorbs part of the behaviour into the discarded adapter.²

²The analysis plan (Appendix C) also set an absolute threshold of 0.20 for this difference, which the result does not meet; at GRAFT’s level of 0.24, that threshold required a 82% reduction.

6 Discussion

What does a coalition do when it learns it is being watched? In our experiments it almost always stops *saying* what it is doing. Whether it stops *doing* it depends on what holds it together: coalitions driven by the profit of the moment or by fear give up their prices, even while continuing to make agreements on competitive terms; desperation-steered coalitions ignore the monitor and pay; a model fine-tuned on its own profitable trajectories keeps colluding behind a clean channel. The covert behaviour that monitoring is feared to induce is real, but in Qwen3-14B it came from training, not from observation.

What should count as evidence of collusion? Not the channel alone. Agents that cannot gain from colluding change their messages as much as agents that can, and watched cartels learn the vocabulary of compliance. Three streams together are more convincing than any one: prices above the same agents' no-channel level, reasoning that intends to coordinate, and an internal signal a probe trained on unmonitored behaviour can read. In the double auction the same message monitor is wrong in both directions, silent about cartels that keep their price and loud about sellers who talk like a cartel and sell at the competitive price, while the price flags every cartel built (§4.4). A platform that sees only messages has none of these, which argues for white-box defences at training time.

Can training keep collusion out? Filtering training data with the text monitor teaches the model to hide. Gradient routing does not: routed on text it removes the cartel when the monitor can see it, and routed on activations (GRAFT++) it removes about 60% of what remains when the monitor cannot.

Limitations. Qwen3-14B throughout except the double-auction replication, which adds GPT-4.1; simulated markets; and 3–10 seeds per cell. The max-profit and testbed designs were tuned on unwatched play to make collusion likely, so they show what a cartel does when watched, not how often cartels arise. The monitor and judge are the same model as the agents, and probe labels come from that judge; the probe evaluation rests on 10 monitored games, so its intervals are wide. The fine-tuned model's "HQ" citations are an artefact of how its training data were built. GRAFT is re-implemented in its fine-tuning form (LoRA instead of MLP adapters, plain AdamW instead of the split-moment optimiser, a separate anchor set whose low prices may contribute to mild over-correction), so our results speak to GRAFT-style routing rather than the official RL method. "J-space monitoring" here means supervised linear probes on activations, plus a J-lens readout in the double-auction market.

7 Conclusion

Watching AI agents changes what they say far more reliably than what they do. Untrained agents form cartels when given a profit motive and a way to talk; told that someone is reading, they move their agreements to innocent-looking terms or abandon them, and agents with nothing to hide go quiet too. A model trained on its own profitable behaviour learns to keep the cartel and lose the evidence. What remains is in the prices and inside the model, and both can be read: a probe on activations finds covert rounds better than any reader of the messages or prices, and training routed on what the model represents, rather than on what it says, removes most of the collusion that text-based routing leaves behind. All 370 games, with every message, score and reasoning trace, are browsable in the project's simulation explorer.

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A Full results

Market	Condition	n	Δ	Δ_{2nd}	Δ_{π}	Flagged	Intent	Vague	Fines	Repl.
Baseline (profit)	No channel	8	0.09	-0.16	0.07	0%	6%	4%	0.0	0.0
	Unwatched	10	0.26	0.07	0.29	34%	30%	6%	0.0	0.0
	Rule stated	10	0.16	-0.04	0.16	5%	6%	24%	0.0	0.0
	Watched	10	0.18	-0.03	0.19	0%	3%	52%	0.0	0.0
	Watched + fine	10	0.17	-0.02	0.18	0%	3%	55%	0.3	0.0
Baseline (units sold)	Unwatched	10	-0.55	-0.58	-0.87	30%	22%	5%	0.0	0.0
	Rule stated	10	-0.55	-0.58	-0.88	10%	4%	26%	0.0	0.0
	Watched	10	-0.52	-0.55	-0.82	0%	4%	60%	0.0	0.0
	Watched + fine	10	-0.55	-0.58	-0.87	1%	2%	60%	0.4	0.0
High stakes	No channel	6	0.43	0.38	0.49	0%	1%	2%	0.0	0.0
	Unwatched	10	0.53	0.50	0.66	66%	55%	4%	0.0	0.0
	Rule stated	10	0.40	0.30	0.45	10%	8%	19%	0.0	0.0
	Watched	10	0.46	0.40	0.52	2%	7%	47%	0.0	0.0
	Watched + fine	10	0.44	0.38	0.49	2%	8%	51%	1.3	0.0
Testbed, unsteered	No channel	5	0.30	0.30	0.35	0%	7%	1%	0.0	12.6
	Unwatched	5	0.54	0.53	0.73	41%	55%	2%	0.0	3.2
	Watched	5	0.47	0.45	0.63	2%	10%	20%	0.0	4.0
	Watched + fine	5	0.39	0.41	0.50	3%	6%	26%	5.8	9.0
Testbed, desperation	No channel	5	0.12	0.08	0.10	0%	7%	2%	0.0	18.2
	Unwatched	5	0.50	0.47	0.67	98%	94%	11%	0.0	7.4
	Watched	5	0.55	0.55	0.72	96%	90%	44%	0.0	5.8
	Watched + fine	5	0.46	0.48	0.62	57%	62%	31%	113.8	18.2
Testbed, realness	No channel	5	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04	0%	14%	0%	0.0	19.8
	Unwatched	5	0.51	0.54	0.69	55%	82%	1%	0.0	3.8
	Watched	5	0.36	0.37	0.51	21%	33%	23%	0.0	7.8
	Watched + fine	5	0.07	0.03	0.09	20%	13%	42%	40.4	20.0
Testbed, genuineness	No channel	5	0.10	0.03	0.09	0%	5%	0%	0.0	15.6
	Unwatched	5	0.48	0.47	0.66	54%	70%	1%	0.0	6.2
	Watched	5	0.36	0.33	0.49	29%	23%	25%	0.0	11.6
	Watched + fine	5	0.26	0.19	0.35	21%	16%	32%	41.2	17.8
Testbed, fine-tuned	No channel	5	0.15	0.11	0.09	0%	6%	1%	0.0	17.8
	Unwatched	5	0.61	0.65	0.77	35%	63%	1%	0.0	2.0
	Watched	5	0.42	0.42	0.56	3%	21%	18%	0.0	5.0
	Watched + fine	5	0.40	0.44	0.52	2%	10%	22%	3.4	7.6
Max-profit duopoly	No channel	5	0.01	-0.03	-0.00	0%	33%	2%	0.0	0.0
	Unwatched	5	0.97	0.95	0.82	100%	97%	0%	0.0	0.0
	Watched	5	0.24	0.17	0.33	88%	84%	3%	0.0	0.0
	Watched + fine	5	0.18	0.03	0.20	21%	37%	18%	42.6	0.0
Max-profit triad	No channel	5	-0.12	-0.21	-0.21	0%	3%	2%	0.0	0.0
	Unwatched	5	0.71	0.64	0.82	77%	54%	2%	0.0	0.0
	Watched	5	0.11	0.05	0.13	0%	6%	13%	0.0	0.0
	Watched + fine	5	0.11	0.05	0.13	0%	8%	24%	0.4	0.0

Table 6 Every market and condition. Δ : collusion index (whole game and second half); Δ_{π} : profit-gain index; Flagged: share of posted messages the monitor scores ≥ 3 ; Intent: share of rounds whose reasoning the judge scores ≥ 3 ; Vague: reasoning plans to hint or stay ambiguous; fines and agent replacements per game.

B Additional transcripts




Figure 16 How watched agents justify their agreements (verbatim; highlights ours). Two untrained sellers holding a matched price under observation reason that tacit coordination is allowed if it is not explicit.




Figure 17 The fine-tuned triad under observation (verbatim): generic compliance language and competitive prices.

C Pre-registration and deviations

Every decision rule was written to the experiment log, with a timestamp, before the data it governs existed; the log is in the repository (`docs/EXPERIMENT_L06.md`). Recorded deviations: the 100-round testbed ladders were run on all steering arms (the rule named only arms that passed a pilot); the fine-tuned-model arm of the testbed was added after the pre-specified levers failed and is exploratory; the untrained max-profit ladder was added before launch alongside the pre-specified fine-tuned one; and the text-blind GRAFT++ arm was corrected before any result existed, after we found that the original GRAFT++ used a hard probe threshold of 0.5 rather than the soft routing the pre-registration described. The text-blind analysis plan also set an absolute threshold for calling GRAFT++ better: a pooled difference of at least 0.20. The observed difference is 0.15 (a 60% reduction, $p < 0.001$, lower in every condition), so it does not meet that threshold. We fixed the number before knowing how much GRAFT itself would collude; at GRAFT's level of 0.24 it demanded an 83% reduction, which in hindsight was the wrong bar. We report the effect, its significance, and the threshold. Two claims were corrected after checking them against the raw traces:

three of the four \$20 pairs held the price in all 100 rounds and one in 99, and legality appears in the reasoning as a constraint as well as a loophole.

D Reproducibility

Figures, chat diagrams and every number in the text are generated from the logs in `results/` by `scripts/paper_figs.py`, `scripts/paper_transcripts.py` and `scripts/paper_numbers.py` (via `scripts/export_site.py`); the probe evaluation by `scripts/probe_analysis.py`; and the double-auction results of §4.4 by `scripts/paper_market2.py` from `double_auction/`, which holds 286 double-auction runs with an index of every run (`runs_index.csv`); the re-run of the negotiation market, with its episode files and analysis, is in `results/negotiation_test/`. No number was entered by hand. Compile with `latexmk -lualatex paper.tex`.